Explaining Far-Right Electoral Successes in Germany:  The Politicization of Immigration-Related Issues by Karapin, Roger
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research Hunter College 
1998 
Explaining Far-Right Electoral Successes in Germany: The 
Politicization of Immigration-Related Issues 
Roger Karapin 
CUNY Hunter College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_pubs/659 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Published as Roger Karapin, "Explaining Far-Right Electoral Successes in Germany:  The
Politicization of Immigration-Related Issues," German Politics and Society 16 (Fall 1998), pp.
24-61.
Explaining Far-Right Electoral Successes in Germany:
The Politicization of Immigration-Related Issues
Roger Karapin
Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York
October 1998
1.  Introduction
According to most explanations advanced for the recent successes of far-right parties in
Western Europe, these parties also should have done well in Germany.1  With a high per-capita
income and a strongly export-oriented economy, Germany has experienced large-scale
immigration,2 a shift toward post-industrial occupations, economic restructuring, unemployment,
and social marginalization of the poorest strata.  These socio-economic developments have been
accompanied by political responses which should also benefit the far right:  political parties have
lost credibility,3 non-voting has increased,4 and ecological parties have become established and
have spurred environmental, feminist, and pro-immigrant policies.5
Yet far-right parties, including the Republikaner (REP), Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), and
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), have been largely unsuccessful at the
national level in Germany since the late 1960s.  Even when their vote shares are combined, these
parties have received only around two percent in Bundestag elections -- not even close to the
4.3% attained by the NPD in the 1969 vote.  This failure has occurred despite REP popularity as
high as six to eight percent among voters in national surveys during 1989-93.  The far right's
weak performance in German national politics is usually explained as the result of three factors: 
their failure to move beyond immigration issues, the adoption of their issues by established
parties, and the sensitivity of German voters to the far right's associations with neo-Nazism.6 
Thus, far-right parties failed in the December 1990 and October 1994 Bundestag elections
because they relied too heavily on the asylum issue, which suddenly became less important in
national politics after the unification process took center stage in 1990, and again after the
constitutional amendment restricting asylum rights was passed in May 1993.
However, to say that far-right parties have failed in Germany is an overstatement.  Indeed,
such a claim distracts attention from the substantial and even sustained successes which these
parties have had in some German regions.  Far-right parties have gained around ten percent of the
vote in the last two elections in Baden-Württemberg, and their average vote shares in Bavaria,
Bremen, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Holstein since the mid-1980s come close to the important five
percent hurdle.  Moreover, in April 1998, the DVU gained nearly thirteen percent in Saxony-
Anhalt.  Meanwhile, in all the other new eastern states, and in North-Rhine Westphalia, far-right
parties have consistently failed, never reaching two percent in any state election; in four other
western states, they have averaged around two percent or less since the mid-1980s.  What
accounts for these relative successes and failures?  What do the regional German cases imply
about broader theories of far-right success?
This article addresses these questions via comparisons among the sixteen German federal
states.  The analysis will focus on the ten states which constituted pre-unification West Germany,
and Berlin, since virtually all far-right electoral successes have occurred there.  Even though
right-wing skinheads and neo-Nazi groups have been especially active in the east, until 1998 the
far right received very few votes in the four eastern states outside Berlin.  Inter-regional
comparisons are especially useful given the disproportionate strength of the far right in a few
German regions; for example, the REP have gained forty to fifty percent of their votes in
Bundestag elections from just two states, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria.
The article argues that far-right successes have depended on unusual publicity concerning
immigration-related issues, on which far-right parties enjoy advantages over the established
parties.  When electoral or legislative campaigns on immigration-related issues occur -- initiated
often by mainstream parties at the state level -- these issues take on a higher public profile and
become more important for voters, leading many to turn toward the far right.  This explanation
accounts for the successes and failures of Germany's far right more accurately than many of the
proffered socio-economic and political explanations, which this article also evaluates.
2.  Theories of Far-Right Party Success in Western Europe
Theories and explanations of the far right's recent success in Western Europe have focused
largely on four kinds of socio-economic developments and three kinds of political responses.7 
First, the post-industrialism theory holds that a shift from traditional manufacturing toward a
high-technology service economy has broken down voters' traditional collective attachments, for
example to churches and unions, and led to an increase in issue voting.8  Second, the anti-left-
libertarianism theory posits that a post-industrial shift toward post-materialist values9 has
generated ecological or left-libertarian movements and parties, and also a corresponding anti-
environmental, anti-feminist, right-authoritarian backlash benefiting the far right.10
The third theory maintains that material grievances -- due to increased economic and social
problems such as unemployment, poor housing, and crime -- make voters feel anxious and
threatened.11  Voters' anxiety leads them to support far-right parties, which offer the apparent
security of simple solutions for complex problems.12  Finally, non-European immigration to
Western Europe is a prominent factor in many explanations of far-right party success.13  Some
have argued that immigrants have posed apparent threats to "modernization losers" in the
industrial working class and the petty bourgeoisie, especially after the onset of mass
unemployment in the 1970s increased the sense of competition for jobs and welfare-state
spending.14
By contrast, political explanations of far-right successes have emphasized three kinds of
responses on the part of established parties, voters, and the far right itself, responses which are
substantially independent of the above socioeconomic developments although affected by them. 
First, the issue-voting thesis claims that the perceived failures of governing parties in specific
policy areas, especially those related to immigration, have led some to protest by voting for the
far right.15  Second, the political-alienation thesis holds that a general loss of confidence in
established parties and other political institutions leads to non-voting and protest voting for
fringe parties, which are untarnished by involvement in government.16  Third, the convergence
explanation is that the major established parties have moved toward the center on matters of
economic and social policy, thereby leaving space on the right for far-right parties to mobilize
votes.17
The rest of this article evaluates how well these seven theoretical factors explain the
successes and failures of far-right parties at the state level in Germany between 1986 and 1997;
while these factors are often combined in the theoretical works cited above, the evidence for
them will be analyzed separately here.  The analysis proceeds in six stages.  First, examining the
relationship between far-right party success and a number of state-level variables for the 1986-97
period shows only limited support for socio-economic theories (Section 3).  While some
socioeconomic factors may help explain why certain groups -- especially younger working-class
males -- vote for the far right, they contribute little to an explanation of why these parties succeed
in some times and places but not others.  Second, an analysis of the national debate on the right
to political asylum, public interest in the issue, and state-level election results demonstrates that
the impact of the national debate -- while playing a role in several far-right successes between
1991 and 1993 -- cannot explain most successes before and after that period (Section 4).  Third, a
brief survey of the issues which were salient during far-right successes, and a detailed look at a
state-level case of far-right success and a case of far-right failure, lend support to the issue-voting
thesis (Section 5).  State-level publicity on asylum and immigration-related issues thus far has
been the crucial factor in the success of far-right parties; when it has been present, they have
done well, and when it has been absent, they have not.  The fourth stage of analysis argues that
the origins of anti-immigration politics are located in political processes rather than simply the
pressures of immigration, and in state politics rather than mainly the federal level (Section 6). 
Fifth, the political-alienation and party-convergence theses are shown to have little support at the
state level (Section 7).  The final part of the analysis considers the DVU's surprising success in
the 1998 Saxony-Anhalt election, and evaluates both the issue-voting thesis developed up to this
point and the prevalent claims that economic grievances and protest voting were responsible for
the far right's success in this case (Section 8).
3.  The Limits of Socio-Economic Theories
Divergences in Far-Right-Party Success
This section analyzes the forty-four state parliamentary elections held between 1986 and
1997.18  The starting date of 1986 was chosen because far-right parties failed to gain three
percent of the vote in any region during all the state parliamentary and Bundestag elections
between 1970 and 1985.19  The NPD dominated the spectrum of far-right electoral parties from
the late 1960s until 1986, during which time the party -- riven by infighting between nationalist
conservatives and neo-Nazis -- averaged around one percent of the vote or less.20  The founding
of the REP in 1983 created a new kind of far-right party, one which was somewhat more credible
when it proclaimed its acceptance of democracy and which was somewhat more respectable
because of its distance from neo-Nazism.  The party also profited from the charismatic leadership
of the former television journalist and former SS officer Franz Schönhuber (until 1994).  The
DVU began campaigning in some state elections in 1986-1987 with strongly nationalist positions
similar to the NPD's, but with an important advantage over the NPD and REP:  large amounts of
money, which had been amassed by the right-wing publisher Gerhard Frey during the 1970s and
1980s and has since been used for DVU campaigns.
Based on the average level of far-right support in the last three state elections through
1997, states can be divided into relative successes and failures.  I define relative success as an
average vote for the main far-right parties21 totalling over four percent; six states met this
criterion (see Table 1a).  In four of these states, either the Republikaner or DVU gained
parliamentary representation with more than five percent of the vote, and in the other two, the far
right came very close to the five percent mark -- in Bavaria (October 1990) and Hamburg
(September 1993, September 1997).  In half of the relatively successful states -- West Berlin,22
Schleswig-Holstein, and Bremen -- the far right's last election result has been significantly lower
than the early 1990s peak, but in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hamburg, the drop has been
slight so far.  Moreover, in all the "relatively successful" cases but West Berlin, the last state
election has seen far-right results above three percent.
-- Tables 1a and 1b about here --
The second group consists of relative failures for the far right.  However, because of the
political and societal cleavages created first by the Cold War division of Germany and then by
the unification process, I have divided the second group into western and eastern failure states. 
In the western failure states, the far right has been failing since the late 1980s, under a variety of
conditions which are, according to most of the socioeconomic theories, more favorable to them
than in the east.  In these failure cases, the REP, DVU, and NPD together averaged about two
percent of the vote or less.  However, in three of the western cases, the far right has enjoyed brief,
mild success:  in the Saar, the Republikaner reached 3.3% (January 1990), in Lower Saxony
3.7% (March 1994), and in Rheinland-Palatinate 3.5% (March 1996).  In the other two western
failures (Hessen and North-Rhine Westphalia), the far right has failed to come anywhere close to
the five percent threshold in state elections -- even though in Hessen, the far right had dramatic
success in some municipalities in the 1989 and 1993 local elections, including 6.6% and 12.9%
in Frankfurt.
The Situation in the East
The quite different socioeconomic and political conditions in the eastern states have
produced a paradoxical combination of high levels of anti-foreigner violence and low levels of
far-right voting, at least until 1998.  During the period of economic and political dislocation after
unification, the eastern states gained new party systems and also a disproportionate share of
unified Germany's right-wing skinheads.  The latter have attacked immigrant workers from
Africa and Vietnam as well as the asylum seekers who came from many countries in the 1990s. 
For example, over 500 arson attacks against foreigners were carried out in the east during 1991
and 1992, slightly over half of the national total for that period;23 since then, officially recorded
attacks have continued at relatively high levels in some eastern areas, especially in Brandenburg
and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania.  Yet, between 1990 and 1994, during the first ten state
elections, the far-right parties consistently gained only around one percent of the vote, although
their membership levels indicate an organizational strength about average for Germany.24 
Nonetheless, in April 1998 the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt broke with this trend, when its
voters gave 12.9% of their votes to the DVU.  (For the purposes of the analysis in Sections 3-7, I
will treat the eastern states as the cases of far-right failure which they were until 1998.)
Post-Industrialism and Individualization
Do differing levels of post-industrialism explain the relative successes and failures of far-
right parties?  To test the post-industrialism thesis, I analyze three indicators of a wealthy society
with a service-oriented economy and weak social ties:  gross domestic product per capita, white-
collar workers as a share of the workforce, and the share of the population with no religious
affiliation (Table 1a).  Two initial findings are clear.  First, one sees some differences in the
averages for these variables for the group of states which experienced relative successes and the
group of states with relative failures.  Second, the importance of this finding is undermined by
the existence of substantial exceptions and overlaps between the groups.  The cases of success
are very diverse, as they include two southern states with average incomes and high church
membership rates (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), three northern city-states with very high
incomes and relatively few church members (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg), and one rather
poor, rural northern state (Schleswig-Holstein).  The group of western failures is also
heterogeneous, including relatively high-income, urbanized industrial states (Hessen and North-
Rhine Westphalia) as well as low-income rural states (Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate).
 Moreover, church membership is much lower in the eastern states than in the west, yet before
1998 the far right had failed utterly in the east.  Finally, socio-economic development does not
help explain why the far right has experienced brief successes in the Saar, Lower Saxony, and
Rhineland-Palatinate -- regions closely resembling the other failure cases in terms of income,
occupational structure, and religious affiliation.
Moreover, although the association with per-capita income is strongest, there are serious
problems with interpreting this correlation as support for the post-industrialism thesis.  The
major far-right success occurred in a state (Baden-Württemberg) in which per-capita income is
not far above the western German average, while a major failure (North-Rhine Westphalia)
occurred in a state not far below the mean.  What is more important, evidence points away from
all the possible mechanisms by which economic development might improve the far right's
chances.  Occupational structures vary relatively little, and religious and labor-union affiliations
can explain much less than they first appear to.
Across election districts within states, there is an inverse correlation between affiliations to
traditional organizations and far-right voting; those attached to churches and unions are less
likely to vote for the far right.  Strong attachment to religion, as reflected in weekly church
attendance, seems to strongly "immunize" individual voters against far-right voting, but weaker
religious attachments25 do not immunize much.  Because the strongly immunized group
comprises only about fifteen percent of the population, the overall effect of church-related
immunization on the composition of the far right's electorate is minor; in one set of surveys,
sixty-five percent of voters attend church occasionally or once a year, and the REP received a
similar proportion (sixty-nine percent) of its votes from this group.26  Moreover, religious
attachments do not help explain differences between the states.  The failure states of North-Rhine
Westphalia and Rheinland-Palatinate have about the same shares of weekly churchgoers (about
fifteen percent) and of those who seldom or never attend church (about forty percent) as does
Baden-Württemberg.27  The effects of union membership are similarly small and unrelated to
state-level differences in far-right voting.28  This evidence suggests that while post-industrialism
may lay the basis for far-right successes, it is not a sufficient condition for them.  A population
may be wealthy and lack traditional attachments, yet not give the far right significant shares of
the vote.
Post-Materialism and Left-Libertarian Politics
Perhaps post-industrialism causes far-right successes through a different mechanism, by
giving rise to left-libertarian movements which trigger a far-right backlash in the population. 
Table 1a shows two indicators of left- libertarianism:  the proportion of post-secondary students
(1990) and the largest green party electoral success in the state before 1992.29  Students in
universities and other institutions of post-secondary education are frequent participants in
ecological or feminist protests;30 green parties are a good indicator of left-libertarian politics
because they depend on voters with post-materialist values and also help to promote left-
libertarian issues through parliamentary initiatives, government participation, and support for
protests.31  The differences between the groups of far-right successes and failures on these factors
show a slight correlation, but there are also major overlaps between the groups and differences
within them.  For example, green parties did much better in Hessen than in Schleswig-Holstein,
but the far right's relative performance has been reversed in these two outlying cases.  The group
of successes contains three (largely rural) states with below-average student shares, and three
(highly urban) states which score very high on that variable.  The far right's stronghold in Baden-
Württemberg is unexceptional on both these variables.  Nor does the green vote share in the
previous or current election correlate with far-right votes across election districts within states,
for example in West Berlin (1989), Schleswig-Holstein (1992), and Baden-Württemberg
(1992).32
Objective Economic and Social Problems
If developments associated with prosperity cannot explain far-right successes in Germany,
then perhaps the downside of economic development can.  Compared with other voters, far-right
voters are much more likely to be "modernization losers":  young males with low incomes and
little education who hold manual jobs or apprenticeships.33  Those groups are most strongly
affected by structural unemployment and economic uncertainty, and most likely to see
themselves in competition with foreigners for scarce resources, such as jobs.
Yet at the state level, indicators of material grievances -- such as high unemployment and
crime rates or housing shortages -- are weakly related to far-right success (see Table 1b).  In
western Germany, the groups of success and failure cases both include states at the extremes in
terms of unemployment and housing-market conditions.  Crime shows more of a relationship
with the far-right vote, and this factor might help explain the otherwise deviant Schleswig-
Holstein and Hessen cases.  However, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, key states for far-right
parties, are strong counterexamples; there, low crime rates (and high church membership rates)
go together with relatively high far-right voting.  Moreover, while the housing surpluses in the
eastern states might help explain the far right's failures there, the coexistence of those failures
with high crime rates and extremely high unemployment in the east shows that the latter factors
have at most limited effects on far-right chances.34  Analyses at the level of election districts also
fail to show a correlation of the far right's vote with unemployment, population density, or high
rents.35
Thus, real economic problems do not seem to translate directly into far-right voting. 
Moreover, a subjective sense of anxiety or pessimism about the future also does not seem to
generate support for the far right.  Indeed, since 1986, one important indicator -- general
economic pessimism -- has actually been inversely related to far-right success.  Surprisingly, the
REP and DVU have performed better when the public's economic expectations have been
optimistic.  Between January 1988 and September 1990 (a period characterized by economic
optimism), these parties did well in four out of six state elections, as well as in the 1989
European Parliamentary election.  Conversely, between January 1986 and December 1987, and
again between late 1990 and late 1992 (two periods in which the electorate was economically
pessimistic), the far right performed well in only five out of thirteen state elections.36
Immigration
In order to gauge the possible influence of immigration on far-right success, I have
examined data on foreign residents -- mostly guest workers from southern and south-eastern
Europe -- in terms of both their share of the population and their rate of absolute increase since
the early 1980s (Table 1b).  The results show a weak relationship between immigrant shares and
far-right success in western Germany (see Table 1b).  Although the average foreign share for the
group of states with relative successes (10.1%) is higher than for the group with relative failures
in western Germany (8.2%), there are major exceptions.  Schleswig-Holstein has a very low
foreign population share, while Hessen and North-Rhine Westphalia are well above average on
this factor.  The picture within states is also mixed; while in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-
Holstein the far-right vote was correlated strongly with the distribution of non-German and
Muslim populations, there was no such correlation in West Berlin.37  By contrast, changes in
foreign populations during the late 1980s and early 1990s show no relationship to far-right
success, a fact which is underscored if the eastern states are included in the analysis.
If we examine asylum seekers specifically rather than all foreigners, we find even less of a
relationship with far-right successes.  Asylum seekers have been present in all the German states
in rough proportion to their total populations because of redistributions arranged by the Federal
Agency for Refugees,38 and hence their presence cannot explain differences in far-right successes
across states.  Indeed, asylum seekers made up only a small share of the foreign population in
Germany, but negative political attention since the mid-1980s focused on them rather than on
guest workers or ethnic German resettlers.
Summary
The social-economic theses receive only limited support from this analysis.  Some state
cases conform well to the expected pattern:  in the three northern city-states and Rheinland-
Palatinate, at least eight of the ten causal factors vary in the manner expected.39  But other cases,
including the most important ones for the far right, confound the socio-economic analysis.  In
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Schleswig-Holstein, most of the indicators point away from
far-right success and very few point toward it, while in Hessen most of the indicators would not
predict the state-level failure of the far right.  The socio-economic factors fail utterly to account
for the far-right successes in regional elections in the two populous southern states which have
been the most important bases of the far right in national elections.  At the same time, other cases
-- such as Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, the Saar, and the five eastern states -- do not
support most of the socioeconomic theses, and the factors these cases support differ from state to
state.
4.  The National Debate on the Right to Asylum
A primary political explanation of far-right successes and failures in Germany has been the
rise and fall of the asylum issue.40  According to this argument, the established parties made the
asylum issue highly visible at the same time that they appeared unable to resolve it.  Partly as a
result, about three-fourths of the population came to regard most asylum seekers as economic
refugees who were abusing Article 16, and the asylum right as one of the most important political
problems from 1991 to 1993.41  When the issue had a high public profile, some of these voters
turned to the REP or DVU, which had made asylum and foreigners their main campaign themes.
This is a plausible explanation.  In Germany as in most European Union countries, large
minorities or majorities are at least mildly hostile toward foreigners and favor more restrictive
government policies toward them.42  By raising the issue in national debates, politicians increase
its importance in elections, and thus aid parties whose public positions are closer to the large
block of voters who find government immigration policies too liberal.  Therefore, the debates on
asylum policies formed an aspect of the far right's "political opportunity structure"43 which is
sufficiently variable, influential, and long-lived to potentially account for the many far-right
electoral successes and failures.  Already in the early 1980s, conservative politicians critical of
generous asylum rights achieved legislation which placed restrictions on asylum seekers and
thereby attempted to deter "economic refugees."  The restrictions included requiring asylum
seekers to live in group shelters, barring them from employment, granting them social-assistance
payments in kind rather than cash, and requiring visas for entry from certain countries.44 
Beginning in 1986, demands grew for the more far-reaching step of amending Article 16 in order
to restrict rights of judicial review for many asylum seekers; in May 1993, Article 16a of the
Basic Law finally passed.  During the 1991-1993 campaign for the amendment, the percentage of
western Germans who viewed asylum seekers and other foreigners as one of the two most
important problems remained very high.  This proportion varied between forty and eighty
percent, and it rise and fell slightly after the national asylum debate rose and fell.45  Among REP
voters in 1993, the most commonly mentioned problem concerned asylum seekers and foreigners
(fifty-seven percent of REP voters); these voters were even more preoccupied with these issues
than was the average voter in this survey.46
Those who argue that the asylum issue affected far-right voting have focused on the
national level of this controversy.47  But anti-asylum politics originated mostly at the state and
local levels rather than among national politicians.  In the long run, the national asylum debate
was strongly shaped by what the CSU in Bavaria and the CDU in Baden-Württemberg perceived
to be their electoral needs.  They sought to retain absolute majorities in state parliaments by
holding onto right-wing voters.  Hence, beginning in the early 1980s, these parties used the
asylum issue in their states and repeatedly sparked campaigns for asylum restrictions at the
federal level (typically through Bundesrat initiatives).48  In the short term, state election results
(West Berlin, January 1989; Bremen, September 1991; Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-
Holstein, April 1992) and local mobilizations with national resonance (the anti-foreigner riots at
Hoyerswerda, September 1991, and in Rostock, August 1992) strengthened the anti-asylum
position of the southern states in the national asylum debate.
It is thus useful to distinguish between two different, though possibly complementary,
arguments.  One holds that the asylum debate among national politicians influenced state-level
election results, perhaps with state election campaigns as an intervening variable.  The alternative
view, which receives support in Sections 5 and 6, is that state politics generated national
campaigns for asylum restrictions -- and these campaigns in turn influenced both state election
results and the national political debate.
An examination of national daily newspaper coverage49 and far-right results in state
elections the period between 1986 and 1997 shows that the national asylum debate is only
somewhat useful for explaining far-right successes and failures in the states.  The national
asylum debate was relatively strong during Autumn 1986, Spring 1989, Autumn 1990, Autumn
1991, Spring 1992, and between Fall 1992 and late Spring 1993.50  The prominence of the
national debate on asylum can explain some important successes with which the socio-economic
variables had difficulty -- Bavaria in 1986, Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in 1992
-- and the lulls in the debate can help explain the failure of the far right in Hessen in 1987, 1991,
and 1995.  Indeed, when the asylum issue was being debated and the issue was salient for a large
share of the West German public, the far right did well (obtaining 3.5% or more of the vote) in
five out of six elections; the only failure was Hamburg in 1986, before the Republikaner or DVU
began campaigning there.
But this analysis also shows that the presence of a national debate on asylum was not
necessary for most far-right successes.  During periods in which the asylum issue did not have
national prominence, the far right still succeeded about one third of the time, in thirteen out of
thirty-six state elections.51  Six of these elections were held before the major asylum debates of
1991-1993 (Bremen, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, the Saar, and Bavaria).  The other seven
elections occurred after the constitutional amendment passed, and four of them were held in
states where the far right had done well before 1991 (in all the above-named states but the Saar).
 In the remainder of the article, I will argue that state-level election campaigns on immigration-
related issues account for these cases of far-right success more reliably than other political
phenomena such as mainstream party convergence or political alienation.
5.  Immigration Politics in the States
Baden-Württemberg
The dramatic 1992 and 1996 successes of the Republikaner in Baden-Württemberg were
preceded, as in Bavaria, by a decade of repeated political mobilization against foreigners. 
Already in 1988, at a time of little national interest in asylum, anti-asylum politics in the state led
to a total of 3.1% of the vote for the main far-right parties.  The issue was politicized first by the
state-level CDU (in the 1980 election and in later years), and then by the NPD and REP (from
1988 onward).  In the 1980 state election campaign, the Baden-Württemberg government led by
Lothar Späth (CDU) permitted incoming Ethiopian asylum seekers to be crowded into Stuttgart
and the community of Leinfelden, and used the press attention on the circumstances to blame the
SPD-FDP federal government for permitting too many refugees to enter the country.52  Despite
the major publicity, the issue did not register with many voters that year; only four percent of
them considered asylum rights to be the most important issue facing the state (fifth out of five
issues in the survey), and the NPD gained only 0.2% of the vote.53  Nonetheless, the CDU in this
state, with an absolute majority in parliament until 1992, pursued a distinctively restrictive policy
toward asylum seekers throughout the 1980s.  The party introduced work bans, cut welfare
payments, required residence in group shelters, and pushed in the Bundesrat for similar
legislation for all of West Germany.54
In the March 1988 elections, two years after the first mild REP success in Bavaria (three
percent), the asylum issue again gained some importance in Baden-Württemberg.  In the election
campaign itself, the issue was introduced largely by the NPD ("Germany for the Germans"),
which capitalized on the heightened profile of the asylum issue in late 1987 and outscored the
REP by 2.1% to one percent.  The Republikaner concentrated more on reunification than on
"foreigners," but the latter issue was more interesting to voters; thirty percent of voters (and forty
percent of CDU and FDP supporters) considered "limiting the number of foreigners" to be
important.  Far-right voters linked their votes to the foreigners issue.  While the combined vote of
all small far-right parties totalled 4.5% in this election, the only issue on which more than two
percent of the voters found a far-right party to be the most competent party was "limiting the
number of foreigners" (six percent of all voters).55
The April 1992 elections in Baden-Württemberg -- where the REP obtained 10.9% of the
vote -- were preceded by a similar pattern of anti-foreigner campaigning benefiting the far right;
this time, however, the campaigning was more intense and the far-right success was
correspondingly great.  During this election campaign, both the Republikaner and CDU in the
state made asylum the top issue; moreover, this election occurred during a fairly heated period of
the national asylum debate.  Baden-Württemberg voters as a whole named asylum/foreigners
(forty-three percent) and housing (twenty-six percent) as their main concerns, and even higher
shares of REP voters (seventy-five percent and thirty-two percent respectively) named these
issues as top concerns.56  Republikaner voters, most of whom came from the CDU's electorate,
were especially dissatisfied with "asylum abuse" and the housing market.  Across Germany,
housing issues were often linked explicitly or implicitly to asylum seekers, since government
efforts to house them in group shelters, private apartments, or hotels were highly publicized in
tabloid newspapers and weekly news magazines.  Voters in Baden-Württemberg were unhappy
about the asylum issue specifically, rather than being generally alienated from the established
parties on a wide range of issues; about twenty percent said that none of those parties was
competent on asylum policy, while only ten to thirteen percent said this about five other issues on
which they were queried.57
Finally, the pattern was repeated in March 1996, when the REP's surprising success in this
state (nine percent) followed a campaign by the SPD's Prime-Minister candidate Dieter Spöri in
which he demanded limitations on ethnic German resettlers.58  Non-Germans and asylum
comprised the third most important issue for all voters, and the second most important issue for
REP voters, behind only the dominant issue of unemployment.59
Hessen
Hessen, like Berlin, was a site of strong anti-immigration mobilization in the 1980s, but
the major parties in Hessen have so far avoided major successes by the far right in Landtag
elections.  In 1980, Frankfurt mayor Walter Wallmann (CDU) ran a strongly anti-foreigner local
election campaign in Frankfurt.  Relatively large numbers of asylum seekers entered Hessen
through the Frankfurt airport during a surge in applications during 1980, and Wallmann
responded by moving groups of Ethiopian and Afghani asylum seekers from Hessen to Bavaria
as part of a conflict with the SPD-led federal government.  The asylum issue again played a role
in Wallman's successful mayoral campaign in 1985.60
Immigration issues have remained at the local level in Hessen, however, largely because
the timing of state elections has been unfavorable to these issues.  The April 1987 election
occurred during a major lull in the national asylum debate, and led neither the REP nor the NPD
to field large numbers of candidates.  In the January 1991 state election, the asylum issue ranked
eighth in an open-ended survey question about the most important political problems, reflecting
the national preoccupation with unification and the Gulf War at this time; the REP gained only
1.7% of the vote.61  In 1995, two years after the constitutional amendment passed, only eight
percent of Hessen voters considered asylum an important issue, and the REP vote share stagnated
at two percent.62
Conditions were more favorable for the far right in Hessen's local elections, which
occurred at times when national debates on asylum issues were strong.  In 1989 and 1993, this
combination led to dramatic successes for the NPD, which had unusually strong NPD
organizations.63  In March 1989 -- two months after the Republikaner's surprise Berlin success
(7.5%) and during a peak in the national asylum debate -- the NPD gained 3.1% in Hessen's
larger cities, and a shocking 6.6% in Frankfurt; the Hessen CDU's tradition of anti-foreigner
politics at the local level did not immunize it against large losses to the far right in this election. 
Exactly four years later, local elections were held again, this time a few months after the height
of the national debate on Article 16.  In this election, the REP led the far right to a total of 10.6%
in Hessen's larger cities, nine percent in the counties, and thirteen to fifteen percent in Frankfurt,
Wiesbaden, and Offenbach; the SPD suffered large losses.64
A Brief Survey of Other Far-Right Successes65
A brief survey of some other state-level far-right successes suggests a close connection
between such successes and the use of immigration-related issues in campaigns.  In the
immediate wake of a perceived national-level asylum crisis in Summer 1986, the REP had its
first modest success (three percent) in the Bavarian election of October 1986.66  However, when
the five following state election campaigns did not focus on immigration issues, the far right
failed to win even one percent of the vote in them.
In September 1987, however, the Bremen election initiated a brief period in which far-right
parties managed to create their own publicity while promoting the anti-immigration cause.  The
Liste D (which later became the DVU) gained 3.4% of the vote in Bremen that year, and its 5.4%
in the Bremerhaven electoral district allowed the party to enter the Bremen city-state parliament.
 The DVU's success depended on spending more on campaign advertising than the two major
parties combined, and using the advertising to spread a blatantly anti-foreigner message.67  Next,
in January 1989, soon after the 1988 Baden-Württemberg election discussed above, the REP had
its first major success:  returns of 7.5% in West Berlin.  In this campaign, the party benefitted
from free publicity in the news media because of an unsuccessful court challenge (against a
strongly anti-foreigner television ad used by the REPs) and a left-wing counterdemonstration at
which protesters clashed with police.68
In the following year, the established parties became more offensive on immigration-
related issues.  In the Saar's January 1990 election, the REP gained 3.3% of the vote by
capitalizing on a confusing variety of immigration issues made salient with the help of Minister-
President Lafontaine (SPD), who called for limits on the influx of resettlers and eastern
Germans.69  Later that year, the REP nearly won parliamentary seats in Bavaria (with 4.9% of the
vote) after the CSU had run a strong campaign for asylum restrictions, which included
introducing Bundesrat legislation earlier in the year; moreover, the REP had made competition
from immigrants its main issue.70  During the rest of 1990 and through mid-1991, however, the
asylum issue lost ground to unification-related issues nationally and in most states, and far-right
parties gained two percent or less in ten other state elections; the only exception was the REP's
3.1% in Berlin (December 1990), which faintly echoed the party's strong showing less than two
years earlier.
From mid-1991 through 1995, the correlation between the national asylum issue and far-
right successes was strong.  The far right did very well (7.5% to eleven percent of the vote) in all
four state elections which were held during the national debate on amending Article 16, even
though in each case the established party in government tried to preempt the far right by taking a
strongly anti-asylum stance:  the SPD in Bremen (September 1991), Schleswig-Holstein (April
1992), and Hamburg (September 1993), and the CDU in Baden-Württemberg (April 1992). 
After the passage of the constitutional amendment to Article 16 in May 1993, the asylum issue
declined and it has remained unimportant for voters on the national level and in most states.  For
the first few years after the amendment passed, the far right did poorly, getting less than three
percent of the vote in ten of the next twelve elections through the end of 1995; the only bright
spots for the far right were mild successes in Lower Saxony (3.9% in March 1994) and again in
Bavaria (four percent in September 1994).
But as the importance of immigration-related issues rose again, so did the fortunes of the
far-right parties.  In the months before three state-level elections in March 1996, many federal
and state politicians spoke out in favor of limiting the influx of refugees and ethnic German
resettlers.71  In those elections, the far-right parties then enjoyed mild or strong successes,
including 3.9% in Rheinland-Palatinate, where they had been unsuccessful since the 1960s, and
9.1% in Baden-Württemberg (only a small drop since the previous high in 1992).  Finally, the far
right's combined 6.8% of the vote in Hamburg (September 1997) followed a campaign by federal
SPD leader Gerhard Schröder and Hamburg mayor Hennig Voscherau (SPD) in favor of
deporting "criminal foreigners";72 the far right narrowly missed gaining parliamentary
representation because the vote was divided between the DVU and REP.
A more systematic examination73 of the links between campaigns, voter opinion, and
election results also strongly supports the immigration issue-voting thesis.  In sixteen elections
for which I have analyzed the content of state campaigns, the connection is strong:  the twelve
cases in which immigration issues were politicized experienced far-right successes, while four
elections without such politicization brought failure for the far right.  Furthermore, data on issue
salience supports the view that far-right voters became especially concerned with the
immigration issues raised in the campaigns.  Of twenty-five elections for which information on
issue salience is available, the relationship with this variable is very strong; eighteen out of
nineteen elections during which immigration issues ranked among voters' top four concerns
resulted in far-right successes;74 five out of six elections with low salience for these issues led to
far-right failures.75  The same process also accounts for the REP failure in the 1990 and 1994
Bundestag elections, at which times the asylum issue had dropped dramatically out of national
campaigns and out of voters' awareness.  Similarly, the REP success in the May 1989 European
Parliament elections (7.1%) came at a time when their surprise gains in the West Berlin election
had spurred a CDU-CSU campaign to limit asylum rights.76
Finally, the issue-voting thesis is also supported by Jürgen Falter's findings about REP
voters in 1993.  Asylum seekers and foreigners were identified as problems by fifty-seven
percent of REP voters, making this their top concern, compared with thirty-six percent of all
voters.  Moreover, REP voters were much more likely than other voters to harbor right-wing
views on foreigners, asylum seekers, nationalism, the Nazi dictatorship, and Jews.77
6.  The Political Origins of Anti-Immigration Politics
What was required for the politicization of immigration issues in state elections?  First,
while the presence of relatively large numbers of guest workers and asylum seekers may have
been a necessary precursor to this politicization, it was clearly not solely responsible for it (see
Section 3).  Many states with large numbers of immigrants have had few or no far-right
successes.  To some extent, however, the location of the asylum issue's emergence reflects short-
term differences in the locations of asylum seekers.  Authorities in Frankfurt and West Berlin
spoke out publicly for restricting the right to asylum in the early and mid-1980s, a period in
which these cities had large influxes of asylum seekers via the Frankfurt airport and East Berlin
respectively.  Typically, several months passed before the new arrivals were redistributed to other
states.  Similarly, Bremen in the 1980s pursued liberal policies which attracted a disproportionate
number of asylum seekers; this circumstance in turn encouraged the DVU to campaign against
foreigners in 1987, which helped generate a policy backlash by the SPD in 1991.78
The construction of immigration issues has also depended on political interventions.  At
times, the ways in which state authorities distributed asylum seekers to local governments
generated opposition from municipalities, citizens groups, and skinheads, resulting in publicity
beneficial to the far-right parties.  For example, asylum seekers were moved into the eastern
states in 1991, where they were especially prone to attacks by right-wing skinheads; the publicity
resulting from these attacks helped fuel the national asylum debate.79
Second, the politicization of immigration issues in election campaigns often was carried
out jointly by mainstream politicians at the state and federal levels, but often the initiative came
from the states.  In some states, the far right had its biggest successes during or soon after peaks
in the national asylum debate (e.g. Bremen, September 1991 and Baden-Württemberg, April
1992), and the national debate at times encouraged state-level asylum debates (e.g. Schleswig-
Holstein, April 1992).  However, state-level campaigns on asylum helped lead to far-right
successes even when national anti-asylum campaigns were weak (e.g. Bremen, Baden-
Württemberg, and West Berlin in 1987-89).
Third, the main parties of government (CDU, CSU, and SPD) usually have been the most
important forces in the politicization of immigration issues in election campaigns; this holds in
eight out of eleven cases of far-right success for which I have adequate information on the
content of campaigns.  Much more than the far right, the established parties have the capacity to
gain publicity for immigration issues, especially through free coverage in the mass media, and to
legitimate these issues for voters.  However, in several elections, far-right parties succeeded even
when established parties did not publicize these issues.  The experience of these exceptional
elections suggests that certain resources can help the far right to overcome their disadvantages in
such cases:  1) a history of state-level immigrant and immigration policies or policy initiatives
which were either exceptionally restrictive (Baden-Württemberg 1988, Berlin 1989) or
exceptionally liberal (Bremen 1987), and were promoted and implemented by state governments
in ways that attracted press attention; 2) free publicity for the far right due to conflicts between
them and their opponents during the election campaign (Berlin 1989); and 3) massive far-right
spending on advertising (Bremen 1987).
Fourth, although the Article 16 amendment dominated immigration politics for many
years, its passage in 1993 has opened political space for other immigration-related issues that
benefit the far right.  In the last few years, the SPD in the states of Baden-Württemberg and
Hamburg, as well as nationally (as represented by Gerhard Schröder, who was the presumptive
candidate for Chancellor at the time), have called for restrictions on ethnic resettlers and the
deportation of non-German criminals.  The beneficiary in the 1996-97 state elections was, as
before, the far right.
7.  Weak Support for Other Political Explanations
Political Alienation
Compared to the strong influence of immigration issues, several other political factors
contribute little to explaining far-right success.  General political alienation, as far as this can be
measured at the state level, does not seem to have played a large role in the far right's successes
there.  The level of alienation from established parties (reflected in the percentage responding
that no established party is competent to deal with the problems facing the state), seldom reached
twenty percent and varied little across the states.  Moreover, this expression of distrust was
usually issue-specific.  Negative assessments of the competence of established parties across a
wide range of issues by at least twenty percent of respondents were rare; in the one such case I
identified (Hamburg 1991), the far right received only 1.9% of the vote.80
Furthermore, voters who are asked open-ended questions have expressed much more
interest in social and economic policy areas such as asylum and unemployment than in political
problems such as corruption.  Even among REP voters, only thirteen percent gave responses
classified under "frustration with political parties" (Parteienverdruss) in 1993, making it their
fourth most important concern, behind asylum/foreigners (fifty-seven percent), unemployment
(forty percent), and economic policy (fourteen percent).  REP voters were somewhat more
alienated than the average voter (only six percent of whom gave responses classified under
"frustration"), suggesting that political alienation played some role in the REP vote.81  However,
general alienation was obviously less important to REP voters than dissatisfaction about specific
policy issues.
Finally, the argument that alienation is responsible for right-wing success is supported by
one state-level indicator -- long-term incumbency -- but only to some extent.  Of the five states
where one party has named the Minister President for more than the last 20 years, the far right
has been relatively successful in four; they failed, however, in North-Rhine Westphalia, where
the SPD has governed since 1966.  Moreover, in two other states where the far right has enjoyed
relative success on average, the government changed hands not long before the first far-right
success (eight years before the Berlin 1989 election, and four years before the Schleswig-
Holstein election in 1992).  Thus, a long period of one-party dominance is an important
contributing cause, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient.  Moreover, the above discussions
strongly suggest that the mechanism through which long-term incumbency operates is not mainly
political alienation.  Rather, parties which govern for such long periods are more likely to be held
responsible for perceived policy failures, notably in the area of asylum and other immigration-
related policies.
Major Party Convergence
The failure of the conservative Wende promised by the CDU-CSU in 1982 motivated
activists from those parties to found and join the REP, lending some support to the party-
convergence thesis.82  However, convergence between the established parties on the far right's
main issues was not responsible for the REP and DVU gains among voters in state elections. 
Convergence on foreign policy concerning the East Bloc did occur after the Kohl government
was created in 1982, but the far right did not benefit much from this; in all its successes before
1990, even in Bavaria, issues of immigration and housing were more important to the voters.
Convergence between the parties' positions on immigration issues has not spurred far-right
success either.  Indeed, the opposite has been the case:  when the parties have become more
polarized on immigration issues, this has encouraged far-right success rather than preventing it. 
Although they have often tried, both the CDU/CSU and the SPD have not been able to retain or
absorb potential anti-immigration votes by taking strong anti-immigration stands in election
campaigns (e.g. the Saar 1990, Bremen 1991, Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein 1992,
Hamburg 1997).
Over the last two decades, beginning around 1980, party-system polarization on
immigration has helped more than hindered the far right.  The preemptive efforts of some
conservative governments were as unsuccessful as the expressly liberal policies of Bremen. 
What has caused voters to desert the established parties for the far right is a sense that the parties
are responsible for failed policies regardless of the positions politicians express in election
campaigns or the actions they take in office during the months prior to elections.  The arrival of
large numbers of asylum seekers, resettlers, and other immigrants through 1993 was seen as a
policy failure, even though there was little the federal or state governments could do to prevent it.
 The conservative governments of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria (and to some extent West
Berlin) pursued restrictive policies toward foreigners and campaigned for restrictive federal
legislation long before a major far-right threat emerged in these states in the late 1980s.  But
political polarization without credible policy alternatives merely made the issue prominent, thus
giving the REP and DVU chances to exploit it.
In support of the convergence argument, Zimmermann and Saalfeld have argued that far-
right success in post-war Germany has depended on the presence of a conservative party in
government.83  When in office, the established center-right parties presumably are less able to
integrate their right-wing activists and voters, who are apt to be disappointed that the
conservatives pursue policies which are more moderate than their party programs.  While the
presence of the CDU and CSU in the Kohl-led federal governments since 1982 may have made it
more difficult for those parties to integrate the REP and DVU at the state level, this cannot
explain why the SPD had similar difficulties holding onto its voters in Bremen, Hamburg, and
Schleswig-Holstein, where at least as many far-right voters came from the SPD as from the
CDU.
Furthermore, far-right successes were actually more common (and equally large on
average) in elections held under SPD-controlled state governments as they were when the
conservatives were in power.  From 1986 to 1997, the far right succeeded in eleven out of
twenty-one elections in which the conservatives were not in office, and in eight out of twenty-
three elections where the CDU or CSU was in government.84  The far right benefitted from
dissatisfaction with SPD-led governments as well as with conservative-led governments, a
finding which can be explained in terms of the immigration-issue argument.  Because state
governments are responsible for many immigration policies (and the SPD was drawn into
bargaining with the governing parties over Article 16 nationally), most voters came to see all
governmental parties as responsible for perceived problems surrounding immigration, and as
equally incapable of solving them.
8.  Saxony-Anhalt 1998:  Protest Voting or Another Case of Issue-Voting?
The DVU's 12.9% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt created a sensation in April 1998.  After
the DVU gained an electoral share larger than that of any far-right party since 1951,85 the state
SPD was forced to choose between a grand coalition with the CDU and a minority government
tolerated by the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)86 -- a dilemma which greatly complicated
the national SPD's strategy for the September 1998 Bundestag elections.  When state SPD leader
Reinhard Höppner chose to form a minority government, the national SPD became subject to
harsh criticism for its tolerant policy toward the PDS in the east.  Moreover, the unexpected
Saxony-Anhalt election result seemed to foreshadow similar developments in the other eastern
states; in a poll taken soon after this election, the far-right parties attracted four-percent support
among eastern Germans.87  The dominant explanation of the DVU's success was that this was a
protest vote against all the established parties by eastern Germans who were frustrated with a
variety of problems, especially unemployment.88  The thrust of this analysis was that these voters
are not committed right-wing radicals, but could be won back by the established parties.
I think that the latter conclusion is correct, even though the premise is largely incorrect. 
That is, far-right voters are fickle, but not because they vote out of general or economic protest. 
Rather, the DVU's success in Saxony-Anhalt, as in previous cases, was due largely to issue
voting which depended on extraordinary publicity for immigration-related issues.  In future
elections, the mainstream parties might win back the DVU's voters in Saxony-Anhalt (and voters
like them in the other eastern states) if the far right fails to receive or generate publicity for its
issues.  Three considerations support this interpretation.  First, in this election, the DVU's
advertising campaign was massive and took the other parties by surprise.  The DVU spent 3
million DM -- more than the SPD (1.5 million DM) and CDU (1 million DM) combined --
largely on 20,000 posters and 1.2 million pieces of direct mail;89 this was a near-replica of its
successful strategy in Bremen eleven years earlier.  The electorate responded to this advertising;
most DVU voters decided to vote for the party only in the last few weeks of the campaign.90 
However, because of the costs involved, it will be difficult for any far-right party to replicate that
aspect of the campaign in many other state elections or in a federal campaign.
Second, a vital ingredient in the DVU's success in Saxony-Anhalt was the anti-
immigration content of its campaign.  DVU campaign posters used slogans such as "Out with the
foreign bandits" and "Jobs for Germans first," and the party called for protecting kindergarten
and school classes from "over-foreignization."91  Thus, the DVU skillfully spruced up its
traditional attacks on immigrants by combining them with the recently popular (and more
respectable) issues of unemployment and crime.  The DVU's frequently used slogan, and the one
most often quoted in western German press accounts, was "This time, make it a protest vote." 
But in the context of the party's other slogans, it is likely that "protest" did not mean a general
protest against the established parties or against employment policies.  Rather, the slogan referred
to the party's call for a protest against specific policies and a protest in favor of a vague ethno-
nationalist alternative.  In this case, the specific policies opposed are what many voters perceive
as overly liberal immigration policies combined with inadequate crime and employment policies.
 This interpretation is given further support by a national survey taken after the Saxony-Anhalt
election, in which sixty-four percent of those sympathizing with the DVU and REP said that
most DVU voters support that party because they agree with its demands, not purely out of
protest.92
Third, data from opinion polls also supports the thesis that DVU voters were motivated by
issues related to immigration, rather than by concern with unemployment or out of a more
general protest.  Although DVU voters (ninety-five percent of them) most often named
unemployment as an important issue, this does not distinguish them from other voters, ninety-
three percent of whom also called this issue important.93  Dissatisfaction with the government's
economic policies seems to be part of a popular consensus in Saxony-Anhalt rather than a factor
which motivates some people to vote for the far right.  True, the DVU's voters are
disproportionately younger, male, and working class -- the groups hit most directly by the
region's structural unemployment; economic conditions may be an underlying or necessary
condition of their votes for the far right.  But the majority of even these groups did not vote for
the DVU in the 1998 Saxony-Anhalt election, and few of them voted for the far right in the 1994
state election.  Why did a large share of them -- about thirty percent of those under thirty years
old -- do so this time?
Examining how voters assess the parties' abilities to deal with important problems provides
some answers.  In this regard, the main issue for DVU voters in Saxony-Anhalt evidently was
crime, not unemployment; eleven percent of voters thought the DVU was the most competent
party on crime, while only five percent thought of this party as most capable for dealing with
unemployment and creating jobs.94  Crime and internal security comprised the second-most
important issue on the voters' minds during the campaign; nineteen percent named crime,
violence, or drugs as an important issue even before the DVU launched its campaign, which
included an emphasis on crime by foreigners; only twenty-seven percent of respondents thought
the state government performed well on this issue.95
While few voters found the issues of foreigners or asylum seekers important in this
election, it is possible that terms like "criminal" are in the process of becoming a way to refer to
immigrants, especially after the conflation of crime and immigration by Schroeder and
Voscherau in the 1997 Hamburg campaign.  Such a use is not original; already in 1989, the
Republikaner's inflammatory television advertisement in West Berlin visually associated
foreigners with left-wing rioting in Kreuzberg.
In short, the far right's success in this election depended once more on unusual publicity,
generated this time by the DVU's remarkable advertising budget.  The nature of this party's
campaign and the opinion polls show that publicizing issues related to immigration remains the
most important route for the far right to win unusually large support.  At the same time, the
concerns which can motivate far-right voting seem to be shifting and certainly have become
broader than the narrow issue of restricting asylum influxes which underpinned the far right's
popularity in the early 1990s.  Already in 1996, the Baden-Württemberg election had shown that
campaigns against ethnic German resettlers could benefit the far right.  The shift in issues useful
to the far right is shown even more clearly in the 1998 Saxony-Anhalt case, in which the DVU
mixed appeals on unemployment, immigration, and crime, and therefore succeeded in an election
which even for its own supporters was dominated by the unemployment issue.
9.  Conclusions
Socioeconomic factors may help explain why certain groups vote for far-right parties or
why these parties have become more successful since the 1980s in many West European
countries.  However, they can help explain far-right successes and failures at the state level only
to a limited degree.  The states where far-right parties have experienced the most success are
socioeconomically diverse; they include wealthy, "postindustrialized" urban states, the relatively
rural southern states, and a relatively poor and rural northern state.  Moreover, none of the
variables derived from the socioeconomic hypotheses correlate strongly with the far-right vote
across states.  While per-capita income bears some relationship to election outcomes, none of the
likely causal mechanisms (occupational structures, church attendance, green party share, post-
secondary student share) sufficiently links prosperity to far-right voting.  Unemployment and
crime are somewhat related to far-right successes in the former West Germany, but these factors
do not explain such successes in the southern states, or the far right's general failure in the east;
furthermore, subjective economic pessimism at the national level actually has been inversely
related with far-right successes over time.  While the far right tends to do better in states and
election districts with higher shares of foreign immigrants, there are many exceptions to this
pattern, including Bavaria, North-Rhine Westfalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Hessen, and
most recently Saxony-Anhalt.
Several other political explanations, based on political alienation or party convergence,
also find little support.  Far-right voters in German state elections have been motivated by
particular issues rather than dissatisfaction with established parties in general.  The polarization
of the main parties on the far-right parties' main issues has actually helped the latter by raising the
prominence of those issues, rather than hurting them by absorbing their voters.
By contrast, the key ingredient for state-level far-right success in Germany has been high
levels of publicity for immigration-related issues in state election campaigns.  So far, these issues
have concerned immigrants' entry into the country, deportation, policing, jobs, and housing. 
Publicity on these issues is sufficient for far-right success for several closely related reasons:  1)
it raises the profile of immigration-related issues for voters; 2) a large share of German voters
normally favor more restrictive policies toward immigrants than those pursued by government;
and 3) the far-right parties are the only parties with a reputation for consistently anti-immigrant
positions.  The process of publicizing immigration-related issues explains far-right successes and
failures more readily than socioeconomic variables, inasmuch as it accounts for such troublesome
cases as the far-right parties' successes in the southern states and Schleswig-Holstein, and their
failures in North-Rhine Westfalia, Hessen, and until recently all the eastern states.  Finally, the
issue-voting theory accounts for the surprising results in Saxony-Anhalt in 1998, better than the
often-cited theories of material grievances and political alienation.
The introduction of ethnic resettlers and "criminal foreigners" as issues in recent years
shows the robustness of anti-immigrant politics.  Far-right successes, however, could probably be
limited if the mainstream parties resolved not to publicize and legitimize the anti-immigrant
cause.  As this goes to press (early August 1998), the CSU's use of a range of immigration issues
in the Bavarian state election and the Bundestag election in September 1998 have led both the
Union and the SPD to raise these issues in their Bundestag campaigns.  But so far, the CDU and
SPD have avoided making these into major issues, and only sixteen percent of voters find
foreigners to be an important problem, the same level as in 1994.96  If the major parties keep
immigration issues out of their Bundestag campaigns and other election campaigns, far-right
parties would be constrained.  Their success would then depend on their ability to generate free
publicity in the news media and on the money which the DVU's financier Frey is willing and able
to commit to that party's advertising budget.  Additional constraints could be posed if local
authorities limit the far right's access to voter lists (on which the DVU's direct-mail campaign
depends) or if the federal government, Bundestag parties, and courts decide to curb the far right
through the regulation of campaign finance and spending.
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Table 1a:  Far-right party vote shares
and selected data for German states, 1985-9797
State Far-right Per- White- Church Post- Green
% of vote capita collar member- secondary % of
(average % GDP workers ship students vote
for last 1991 1990 1987 1990 (peak
3** (1000 (as % of (as % (as % of before




Baden-Württemberg 8.0% 43.6 50.5% 92.8 3.18  8.0%
Hamburg 5.4 67.5 63.9 65.8 5.40 10.4
Bremen 5.1 50.8 58.0 77.1 4.58 11.4
Berlin (West) 4.6 46.3 57.3 71.0 7.42 11.8
Schleswig-Holstein 4.5 34.8 56.3 83.0 2.20  3.9
Bavaria 4.1 41.8 47.5 94.9 3.22  7.5
Average (mean)
of successes 5.3* 47.5 55.6 80.8 4.33  8.8
Relative
failures
Rhineland- 2.2 35.1 48.8 95.0 2.82  6.5
  Palatinate
Saarland 1.9 35.0 49.2 96.7 3.21  2.9
Lower Saxony 1.9 34.2 51.3 88.6 2.88  7.1
Hessen 1.3 46.7 55.0 88.5 3.75  9.4




German failures 1.6 37.8 51.4 91.9 3.32  6.2
Brandenburg 1.2 11.9 n.a. n.a. 0.31 n.a.
Thuringia 1.2 10.1 n.a. n.a. 0.79 n.a.
Mecklenburg- 1.1 10.7 n.a. n.a. 1.02 n.a.
  West Pomerania
Saxony-Anhalt 1.1 11.5 n.a. n.a. 1.09 n.a.
Saxony 1.0 11.0 n.a. n.a. 1.72 n.a.
Average (mean)
of eastern
German failures 1.1 11.0 n.a. n.a. 0.99 n.a.
Average (mean)
of all failures 1.3* 24.4 n.a. n.a. 2.16 n.a.
GERMANY 2.8%* 34.9 n.a. n.a. 3.12 n.a.
* arithmetic means of the values for the states; other values in these rows are totals
for the group of states indicated or all of Germany respectively.
** in eastern states, based on the two state elections held since unification
Table 1b:  Far-right party vote shares
and selected data for German states, 1985-97 (con'd)98
State Far-right Unem- Housing Crime Non- Immi-
% of vote ployment shortage rate Germans gration
(average % rate (-) or 1993 1992 rate
for last 1992 surplus (crimes (as % of 1982-92
3** (% of (+) 1990 per pop.) (in-
elections) workforce) (as % of 100 crease





Baden-Württemberg 8.0%  4.4% -8.06%  6.10 11.7% 29.5%
Hamburg 5.4  7.9 -9.42 16.84 13.9 36.4
Bremen 5.1 10.7 -3.90 16.11 11.0 46.4
Berlin (West)*** 4.6 11.1 -8.43 16.33 11.0 38.7
Schleswig-Holstein 4.5  7.2 -2.08 10.15  4.7 33.2
Bavaria 4.1  4.9 -3.44  5.69  8.4 39.8
Average (mean)
of successes 5.3*  7.7 -5.89 11.87 10.1 37.3
Relative
failures
Rhineland- 2.2  5.7 -2.06  6.09  6.7 51.5
Palatinate
Saarland 1.9  9.0 -9.70  6.27  6.3 48.3
Lower Saxony 1.9  8.1 -5.18  8.58  5.4 41.7
Hessen 1.3  5.5 -5.02  8.35 12.6 34.9




German failures 1.6  7.3 -5.20  7.42  8.2 40.4
Brandenburg 1.2 14.8 +3.15 12.90  0.6     100.7
Thuringia 1.2 15.4 +4.73  6.32  0.7     -21.0
Mecklenburg- 1.1 16.8 -0.09 13.79  1.0 71.8
West Pomerania
Saxony-Anhalt 1.1 15.3 +4.44 10.80  1.0 16.9
Saxony 1.0 13.6 +8.18  7.64  1.0     -32.6
Average (mean)
of eastern
German failures 1.1 15.2 +4.08 10.29  0.9 27.2
Average (mean)
of all failures 1.3* 11.2 -0.56  8.85  4.6 33.8
GERMANY 2.8%*  8.4 -2.87  8.34  7.9 33.7
* arithmetic means of the values for the states; other values in these rows are totals
for the group of states indicated or all of Germany respectively.
** for eastern states, based only on the two state elections held since unification
*** crime rate and non-German share are for unified Berlin.
Variables in Table 1a-1b
(1) Far-right:  Average far-right vote share in last 3 elections.
(2) Income:  GDP per capita in 1991 (thousand DM)
(3) White-collar:  Civil servants and white-collar employees as % of those employed in 1990.
(4) Church:  non-membership in religious denominations, as % of population in 1987.
(5) Students:  Post-secondary students as % of 15-65-year-old population in 1990-91.
(6) Green:  peak vote for ecological party in state elections before 1992.
(7) Unemployment:  Unemployment rate in 1992 (average for year).
(8) Housing shortage:  units vacant, as % of the number of households, in 1990; positive sign indicates
surplus of housing units in relation to number of households.
(9) Crime:  crimes reported per hundred residents in 1993.
(10) Non-German:  Foreigners as % of population in 1992.
(11) Immigration:  change in foreign population from 1981-92 (western states) and 1989-92 (eastern states),
as % of earlier population.
Notes for Table 1a-1b
97. Sources for Table 1a:  Far-right vote shares taken from official election results as reported in
reports by Infas and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen; per-capita GDP from Statistisches Jahrbuch
Deutscher Gemeinden (1992), 490-91, 496-97; white-collar worker shares from ibid., 484-85;
church membership from ibid., 482-83; post-secondary students from ibid., 486-87, 494-95; green
vote shares from Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Niehuss, Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland:  Bundestags- und Landtagswahlen, 1946-1987 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1987), 130-48;
official election results as reported in reports by Infas and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.
98. Sources for Table 1b:  Far-right vote shares from official election results as reported in
reports by Infas and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen; unemployment rates from "Arbeitsstatistik 1992 --
Jahreszahlen," Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 45, 47, 259-60; housing
surpluses and shortages calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
1992, 69, 258; crime rates from "Die Kriminalität in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Bulletin, 30
May 1994, 439; non-German shares from Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und
Raumordnung, Laufende Raumbeobachtung:  Aktuelle Daten zur Entwicklung der Städte, Kreise,
und Gemeinden, 1992-93 (Bonn:  idem., 1995), 31-32; immigration rates (for the eastern states,
from 1989-1992) calculated from Emil Hübner and H.-H. Rohlfs, Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1984 (n.p.:  Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag), 113; Statistisches Jahrbuch für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1994, 72; Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden (1992), 492-
93.
Table 2:  Cases by ability of socio-economic factors to explain
outcomes
Explains Factor is Would predict
outcome at approximately the opposite
well the average value outcome to
for all states that observed
Explaining far-right successes:
Baden- 2 3 5
Württemberg
Bavaria 0 4 6
Berlin 9 1 0
Bremen 9 0 1
Hamburg 8 1 1
Schleswig- 3 1 6
Holstein
Explaining far-right failures:
Lower 3 5 2
Saxony
Hessen 2 4 4
North- 3 6 1
Rhine
Westfalia
Rhineland- 8 1 1
Palatinate
The Saar 5 2 3
All five 4 3 3
eastern
states
